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Disagreement, debate, and --final Iy--compromise are the inevitable
ingredients of efforts to secure new farm legislation. Congressional action to
extend, modify or replace the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 will involve all
of these elements of economic policy making. With the end of the 1965 act
rapidly approaching, a clearer picture is now emerging of some of the maior
issues that wi II be debated as the Congress moves toward the formu Iation of agri-
cultural policies for the decade ahead. The purpose of this article is to assess the
results of recent farm programs and to examine the economic and political setting
in which agricultural policy for the 1970’s wil I be argued and decided.
Present agricultural price-support and production-ad iustment programs for
maior farm commodities expire with the 1970 crop. These programs were author
for 1965-69 by the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 and extended to 1970 by
legislation approved in October of 1968. The one-year extension of existing
zed
programs won Congressional approval only after extensive debate and was adopted
as a stop-gap measure when the House refused to agree to a four-year program that
had passed the Senate.
The present Administration has moved slowly and cautiously in developing
its proposals concerning future agricultural policy, perhaps partly because it has
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been forced to concentrate on other, more pressing political issues.
In September, 1969, Secretary of Agriculture Hardin went before the
House Agriculture Committee to outline some of the maior features of the admini-
stration’s position on new farm porgrams. So far, the strategy of the administration
has been to present a general plan for agricultural programs rather than to push for
a particular bill. The ideas presented by Secretary Hardin in his testimony before
the House Agriculture Committee do not differ substantial Iy from those embodied
in current programs. The Secretary has emphasized his desire to work with
Congressional leaders in shaping new farm legislation and it now appears that the
iob of hammering out the details of a farm bil I will be left to the discretion of
Congress. Congressman Poage, Chairman of the Committee, would
quickly in getting a farm bill through his committee.
Abrupt shifts in agricultural policy are uncommon in formulati
ike to move
mof U.S.
farm programs. Present programs have evolved over several decades of experience
in attempting to achieve a more satisfactory solution to the nation’s farm problems.
We can gain some insight into the direction that future farm pol icy may take by
looking at the results of past programs.
Farm Programs In The 1950’s
U.S. farmers entered the decade of the 1950’s following a period of prosperity
brought on by the high demand for food during and immediately fol lowing World
War II. But problems of adiusting to a peacetime economy were soon felt. Farm
prices dipped in the late 1940’s as a result of a mild business recession, a decline-3-
in export demand, and an increase in farm output. Farm income dropped sharply
in 1949, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) began to accumulate
surpluses iust as it had done in the late 1930’s. This sign of potential trouble went
largely unnoticed when the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 caused a
sharp increase in the demand for farm products and enabled the CCC to work down
its commdity holdings.
Demand declined with the end of the Korean War in 1953 and, with farm
output reachiog record Ieve Is, prices again turned down. It soon became evident
that changes wou Id be needed in existing price-support and production-control
programs. Price support levels for some maior farm commodities were stil I set by law
at not less than 90 percent of parity, with the federal government obligated to
support prices through its program of nonrecourse loans and direct purchases.
With output running ahead of demand at the price support levels, CCC stocks
increased sharply. The government acquired stocks equal to about 6 percent of
total farm output in 1952 and 11 percent in 1953. By 1956, CCC price-support
inventories and loans were valued at nearly $8 bill ion.
A maior weakness of the acreage al Iotment and marketing quota programs
of the early 1950’s was that the use of land diverted from controlled crops was
not restricted. Consequent Iy, while the acreage of the four ma ior al Iotment
crops was reduced by nearly 29 mi 1Iion acres from 1953 to 1955, the acreage of
other field crops, mostly feed grains, rose by 27 million acres. Total farm output
was not reduced. As surpluses mounted and farm prices and incomes continued to-4-
fal 1, the Eisenhower administration attempted to ease the situation by stepping
up efforts to dispose of surplus stocks abroad and by removing more Iand from produc-
tion.
The most important action to dispose of surpluses was the passage of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, better known as Public Law
480, in July of 1954. This law authorized the sale of farm commodities for
foreign currency, commodity gifts for relief purposes, and the barter of farm
products in exchange for strategic materials needed by the United States. In its
first four years of operation, the P. L. 480 program accounted
total U.S. farm exports; and even though declining compared
for 27 percent of
to commercial sales,
it continues to be an important vehicle for finding outlets for agricultural products.
Congress turned to a general land retirement program in 1956 in an attempt
to reduce farm output. The Soil Bank program included provisions for the with-
drawal of land from the production of al Iotment crops on a year-t-year basis and
the retirement of farm land for a period of years via longer-term rental agreements.
Both parts of the program were voluntary, with land owners receiving payments
keeping land out of production. The acreage reserve feature of the program
for
undoubted Iy helped to control output, but it was regarded by many as too costly.
It was dropped after 1958. The longer-term conservation reserve feature also
helped check farm output; in July 1960 almost 29 million acres were included in
the program. But there was critic ism of the conservation reserve because of its
adverse effects on communities where large acreages were placed in the program.-5-
Farm Programs In The 1960’s
The Kennedy Administration took office in 1961 with three maior objectives
for agricultural policy: to eliminate surplus stocks of agricultural commodities,
to reduce budget expenditures for farm programs, and to raise farm income.
Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and his advisors felt that these objectives could
be achieved only if farmers could be persuaded to accept tighter governmental
controls on farm output as a means of protecting farm income while avoiding a
further build-up of surpluses. The Administration’s “supply management” proposals
were supported by both the National Farmers Union and the National Grange,
along with Iiberals who wanted to free federal funds for other uses. Opposition to
the plan came from the American Farm Bureau Federation. Many fartrrrelated
businesses whose sales volume would be curtailed by a tightening of production
controls also opposed supply management.
The new Administration was immediately faced with obtaining legislation for
the 1961 crop season. An emergency feed grain program was passed in March to
reduce corn and grain sorghum acreage in 1961. This program and a similar program
to reduce wheat acreage were later extended to the 1962 crops. Under these programs,
producers were required to reduce crop acreage in order to qualify for price supports
and received government payments for divert ing land from production.
Along with the 1961 emergency legislation the administration also proposed
a program with effective supply management provisions but was not successfu I in
getting Congressional action in that year. The Administration final Iy succeeded
in getting maior changes in farm programs when Congress passed the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1962. The most controversial and bitterly contested feature of the-6-
Iaw was the new wheat program, which abolished the 55 mil lion acre minimum
.
national al Iotment, brought growers with less than 15 acres into the program,
and instituted a multiple-price system of supports with mandatory controls on
output. However, the administration’s victory in getting new wheat legislation
was short-1 ived. Wheat growers went to the pol Is in record numbers in the
producer referendum held in May of 1963 and overwhelmingly reiected the farm
program of the Kennedy administration. This defeat snuffed out any hope that
the administration had for moving toward more control of farm output under mandatory
product ion controls.
President Johnson inherited a farm policy that was in trouble. Carryovers
of wheat and feed grains had been reduced a I ittle from the extremely high levels
of 1961 but were sti II excessive, and the carryover of cotton had soared. The
administration placed the need for agricultural legislation high on its Iist of
priorities in 1964, with particular emphasis on wheat and cotton stocks that were
reaching crisis proportions.
Legislation approved in 1964 established a VOIuntary wheat program using
marketing certificates. Wheat growers who complied with acreage al Iotments and
cutback wheat acreage were to be eligible for price supports and land diversion
payments. The loan rate for wheat was dropped to $1.30 per bushel, thus
permitting the market price for wheat to decline to
in world markets and the use of wheat for feed.
To supplement market prices, those who comp
evels that would be competitive
ied with the provisions of the-7-
new program received negotiable certificates worth $.70 per bushel on their pro
rata share of the domestic market volume and $,25 per bushel for their share of
wheat exports.
The cotton program also was altered by legislation passed in 1964, but very
fewwere happy with the program that finally emerged. Carryover of cotton
continued to c1imb, and it was general Iy agreed that additional changes would
have to be made in the program.
The stage now was set for new farm legislation in 1965. The Food and
Agriculture Act of 1965 made no sharp changes in farm programs; rather it rein-
forced the direction of agricultural policy that had been emerging over the previous
years. This policy has involved several developments that may be continued into
the 1970’s: First, the Secretary of Agriculture has been given considerable discre -
t ion in setting price support levels and acreage programs. Second, price supports
for most commodities have been reduced or modified so as to permit lower market
prices. This in turn has helped reduce the price incentives leading to increased
output and the need for export subsidies to move U.S. farm products in world trade.
Third, direct payments to farmers have become increasing y important as a means
both of supplementing farmers’ income and of securing “voluntary” reduction of
crop acreage. By 1968 government payments to farmers and owners of farm land
had risen to almost $3.5 bil lion annual Iy from about $700 thousand in 1960.
Fourth, land diversion and ret irement programs have been continued as the maior
means of holding back farm output. Fifth, efforts have been made to shift a part of
the cost of farm programs to U.S. consumers, such as through the use of processor
certificates on domestic mil Iing wheat.-8-
1/
Commodity Programs Under The 1965 Act -
Feed Grains
The 1965 Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture , considerable discretionary
power to operate the feed grain program either as an incentive to expand output
or as a brake to reduce output. To some extent, each of these goals was pursued
between 1966 and 1969.
The essent ia I features of the feed grain program are as fo Ilows: (1) farmers
who participate in the program must idle a given portion of their historically-
determined feed grain acreage a IIotment and comply with certain other acreage buses
applied to their whole farm, (2) in return, participating farmers are eligible for
price support loans on the feed grains produced within the permitted acreage and
for price support payments which are Imsed on some portion of the normal output
on the permitted acreage and (3) participants are also eligible for diversion payments
which are based on additional land voluntarily diverted from production alxwe that
required in order to qua Iif y for price support payments.
In 1968, for example, participating corn farmers idled at least 20 percent of their
corn acreage al Iotment. They were then eligible for price support loans of $1.05
per bushel on al I actual production. They received no diversion payments on the
idled 20 percent but did receive a 30 cent per bushel direct support payment on the
normal (or average) production of half of the permitted acreage. Normal or average
product ion was calculated from the 1962-66 average yields, adiusted for trend. In
‘/An analysis of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 and its implications for
Minnesota farmers was published in Minnesota Farm Business Notes, Specia I - 1965.-9-
1968, additional voluntary diversion beyond the 20 percent required for minimum
participation in the program was eligible for diversion payments.
A voluntary program of this type is expensive since farmers must be induced
to participate by economic incentives, no direct penalties being attached to
non-participation. Non-participating farmers are not eligible for price support
loans or direct payments but are free to produce as much as they please, taking
their chances on the open market or feeding the grains to their own livestock,
The annua I feed grains programs applied to corn and grain sorghum were
roughly similar for the years 1966 to 1969 with the exception of 1967. As the
1967 program was being formulated, a world-wide shortage of grains seemed
Iikely, and market prices were rising. Consequently, the 1967 program was
adiusted to make minimum levels of part icipat ion most attractive; al I diversion
payments except for very sma II farms were eliminated and the price support loan rate
was increased from $1.00 to $1.05 per bushel on corn and $1.52 to $1.61 per cwt.
on grain sorghums. The obiect ive seems to have been to secure an increase in feed
grain production and yet to maintain a high rate of participation in the program.
Participation in the 1967 program dropped SIight Iy from 44 percent of al I feed
grain farmers in 1966 to 43 percent in 1967. However, the acreage actual Iy
diverted from production fel I by a comparatively greater amount from 35 mil lion acres
in 1966 to 20 mil lion acres in 1967. This decline represented a drop from 26 percent
to 17 percent of the national feed grain acreage eligible for diversion. The extreme
shortage of food and feed grains feared earlier did not develop because of good-1o-
harvests in both the developed and less-developed nations. So as U.S. feed grain
product ion expanded neat-l y 12 percent , market prices fel I more than 16 percent.
In the 1968 and 1969 versions of the feed grain program, diversion beyond
the minimum 20 percent again was eligible for payment and the loan rate was held
at $1.05 for corn and $1.61 per cwt. for grain sorghum. Voluntary participation
lumped markedly. About 47 percent of al I eligible feed grain farmers signed up in
1968 and 49 percent in 1969. These growers diver~ed 32 million acres in 1968 and
diverted slightly under 40 million acres in 1969. (About 5 million acres of the
latter figure is due to the inclusion of barley in the 1969 program. ) This resurgence
of program participation boosted diversion from 17 percent of eligible acreage in
1967 to 29 percent in 1968 and to 31 percent in 1969.
The voluntary feed grain programs under the 1965 Act and the annual
“emergency” programs used in the early 1960’s together with growing markets at
home and abroad resu Ited in a steady decrease in government feed grain stocks --
from the record 75 mil lion tons in 1961 to 18 million tons in early 1967. The large
increase in production in 1967 and 1968 relative to ut iIizat ion pushed government
stocks to 32 million tons in 1968 and to 44 million tons in early 1969.
The voluntary feed grain programs have been genera II y successful in restraining
product ion and reducing government stocks over the last 7 or 8 years. They have
been relatively costly and, with their focus on acreage adjustments, their effective -
ness continually eroded as technological advance pushes average y ields higher and
higher.-11-
Wheat
Beginning with the voluntary wheat program in 1965 and
provisions of the 1965 Act, the wheat economy of the United
continuing with the
States has moved into
a two-price marketing scheme; a higher price for domestic users of wheat and a
lower price for wheat produced and ut iIized in excess of domestic requirements.
As with feed grains, the 1965 Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture much
f Iexibi Iity to operate the wheat program to either expand or contract output.
Both goals were pursued during the life of the 1965 Act, Wheat farmers who
participate in the program are entitled to price support loans on their wheat
output at a rate roughly equivalent to the price at which wheat is competitive
in feed grain markets, about $1.25 per bushel. In addition, participants receive
certificate payments on about 43 percent of their acreage al Iotments. These
certificates, worth $1.52 per bashel in 1969 are financed by an assessment of
$.75 per bushel on domestic processors of wheat for food with the remainder
coming from the federa I treasury. In return for these bnefits, the participant
required to remain within his historical Iy-established wheat acreage al Iotment
is
adiusted for changes in the overall national al Iotment. Payments for additional
voluntary diversions of acreage were available in 1966 and 1969. Farmers who
choose not to participate get no certificates and are not eligible for loans on
their wheat, but they are not required to restrict acreage.
Because participants have received an average 40 to 60 cents more per bushe I
than the open market prices available to non-participants, around 85 percent of the-12-
wheat a IIotment acreage has been signed up for the program each year since
1965. As with feed grains, the wheat programs together with growing overseas
shipments helped to reduce stocks from record levels in the early 1960’s to
modest levels in the 1966-67 period. However, the drought -induced food short -
ages in India and elsewhere in 1966 sent food grain prices soaring and touched
off world-wide fears of a severe grain shortage and potent iu I widespread famines.
In response to these deve Iopments and in Iight of the rather low wheat carryover
into 1967 (425 mi IIion bushe Is in 1967 compared with average carryovers of
1,229 mil lion bushels in the 1960-64 period) the national wheat allotment was
increased from 52 mil lion acres in 1966 to 68 million acres in 1967, In addition,
diversion payments were abandoned, and no mandatory diversion for participants
was required. As a result of these meusures, production iumped over 16 percent
while utilization remained virtually constant.
Improved food grain harvests around the world in both developed and less-
developed nations have eased the internat iona I food supply situation and wheat
surplus are again building in the United States. Increases in wheat stocks occurred
in 1967, 1968 and 1969. In the announced wheat program for 1970, the last
permitted under the extended 1965 Act, the Secretary of Agriculture has reduced
the national acreage al Iotment by 12 percent. Diversion payments, re -instated in
1969, were continued in 1970 so as to encourage additional idling of wheat acreage
below al Iotments, Although reasonably successful in reducing stocks of wheat up
to 1967, the wheat program has been expensive since farmers must be induced to-13-
participate voluntari Iy, With its emphasis on acreage adjustments, the program’s
effectiveness is continual Iy being eroded by higher and higher yields.
Soybeans
The 1965 Act contained no specific program changes for soybeans. The
traditional price support loan and storage mechanism with no acreage controls or
marketing restrictions was continued. However, a number of factors occurring
since 1965 have combined to place soybeans in a surplus position -- stocks are
accumulating and prices are resting on or near support levels. First, and prolmbly
most important , was the increase in the average price support rate from $2.25 to
$2.50 per bushel for the 1966, 1967, and 1968 crop years, This decision was
made during early 1966 when prices were high and a world-wide shortage of food
and feed grains seemed IIke Iy. With record crops occurring in most of the world
during 1967 and 1968, together with a modest slackening in demand growth for
soy ban products at home and abroad, the large soybean crops produced under the
higher support rate began to flow increasingly into price support loan stocks, Adding
to the tendency for overproduction in soybeans was the continued downward pressure
on feed grain and cotton acreage being exerted by vo Iuntary programs for these
commodities. Under the 1965 Act, resources other than voluntarily diverted
a IIotment acreage were free to move into soybean production at the attractive
$2,50 support rate. At the same time the $2.50 price support was pegging the
market price at a Ieve I that impeded ful I ut iIizat ion of the crop. Stocks grew
from 30 million bushels at the beginning of the 1966 crop year to 320 mil lion-14-
bushels at the start of the 1969 crop year. in 1969 the support rate was lowered
to $2,25. Although the Iower support rate has stimulated exports, the post
World War II glamour of soybeans in the nation’s farm income picture has been
tarnished.
Cotton
Producers are required to stay within their al Iotments in order to participate
in the cotton program. They then are eligible for a loan rate at a specified level,
a price support payment on a specified percentage of proiected yield on the farm
al Iotment, and possibly a diversion payment for proiected yields on the diverted
acreage. However, in recent years there has been no diversion provision in the
cotton program. The 1965 cotton program resu Ited from the need to do something
about the growing cotton surplus. The August 1, 1965, carryover was 14.3 million
bales and it reached a record 16,5 million bales on August 1, 1966.
The situation has improved in some respects since 1965. Domestics processors
and users of cotton are able to purchase domestic cotton at prices more in line with
world prices. In addition, cotton production has decllned considerably since 1965.
It was about 15 million bales in each of the three years 1964 to 1966. It fell to
half that level in 1967, but, in 1968 and 1969 has hovered around the 10 to 11
million mark. Production in 1969 was about 80 percent of the 1964-66 level. In
an effort to stimu late cotton production, the national cotton a IIotment was increased
to 17 million bales.
Production of substitute fibers shows no abatement. In 1965 U.S. man-made
fiber production was equal to 11,769 cotton bales. In 1968, it was equal to 17,112-15-
cotton bales. Regardless of the program to make cotton more competitive, man-
made fibers stil I experienced tremendous production growth. Even though the
total market for fiber has grown, domestic use of cotton has remained static.
The import-export situation for cotton has exhibited no discernible trend.
Imports are relatively low. Exports for 1967-68 were at the lowest level in
thirteen years, but exports have tradit iona I Iy exhibited large variation, We
continue to be a net exporter of cotton.
The cotton program appears to have had an impact on carryover. From the
16.5 million bales on August 1, 1966, carryover was at 6.4 million bales on
August 1, 1969.
The program under the 1965 Act has had Iitt Ie impact on the import-export
picture for cotton equ iva lent in manufactured cotton goods. In 1960, we
switched from a net exporting to a net importing country for these goods. In only
one year since, have we been a net exporter. For the last three years we have been
a net importer to the extent of more than 300 mil lien pounds of cotton annually.
Cotton programs probably have been criticized more than any of those for other
commodities. It has been charged the cotton programs have hastened if not caused
loss of markets both at home and abroad. The program under the 1965 Act is
expensive and its benefits have gone heavily to the larger growers, For example,
when the total of producer payments, net loans made by CCC, Public Law 480 Costs,
carrying charges and administrative costs for cotton are considered, the cost of these
items is greater than the market value of the crop,-16-
Much of the impetus for a Iimiatatim. of payments to farmers under the
commodity programs stems from the cotton program. Of the slightly over 10
mil lion producers receiving government payments totaling $20,000 or more in
1968, sIight Iy over one-half received payments under the cotton program. Yet,
cotton producers accounted for less than one-fifth of the 2.5 million participating
farmers.
Dairy
The 1965 Food and Agricultural Act made no change in the method of
determining price supports levels for milk, or in supporting milk prices. These
matters are provided for under legislation passed in 1949. However, it did
provide: (1) for the use of a Class 1 base program in federal order milk markets,
(2) for the use of federal orders in manufacturing milk producing areas, and (3)
the Secretary of Agriculture with authority to purchase dairy products in commercial
market for domestic relief, foreign distribution and other programs when CCC stocks
were insufficient to meet these needs,
The Class 1 base authorization under the 1965 Act has been used to on Iy a
limited extent. A Class 1 base program has been developed in the Puget Sound
federa I order. A proposa I for a Class 1 base program has been recent Iy turned down
in the Florida order. Under this provision the Class 1 sales of a market are al located
to existing producers. Thus, a producer is paid for a specified Class 1 usage regardless
of the market utilization. Procedures have been set up to permit new producem to
obtain a Class 1 base.-17-
The 1965 Act authorized extension
mi Ik producing areas. But this program
appear to be much interest in using this
of the federal order program to manufacturing
has not been utilized, and there does rmt
authority.
The authorization to purchase dairy products in commercia I market at market
prices when CCC stocks are insufficient for government programs has been used for
processed cheddar and American cheese. Stocks of butter and nonfat dry milk from
price support purchases have been sufficient to meet al I U.S. government commit-
ments.
Although no change
price supports level, the
was made in 1965 in the method of determining the milk
milk price situation has improved dramat ical Iy since that
time, Import quotas have played an important role in this development in view of
increased world supplies of dairy products. The average U.S. prices for all milk
was $4.23 per cwt, in 1965, The average 1968 figure was $5.25 per cwt . -- the
figure for 1969 will be higher. From 1965 to 1968 there was a 24 percent increase
in price. Manufacturing grade milk prices averaged $3,45 per cwt. in 1965 and
$4.30 per cwt. in 1968. A 25 percent increase with additional increases in 1969,
Support prices for manufacturing milk were increased during this period, but they
tended to fol low rather than precede market price increase.
The cause of the milk price increase is largely a supply phenomenon. U.S.
milk production reached a record 127 bil lion pounds in 1964 and has fal Ien
continual Iy since then. U.S. production in 1969 is proiected to be around 116
bil lion pounds. A reversa I of the downward trend in production is not expected in-18-
the next few years.
The effect of the price increase on producer income is moderated to some
extent by rising input costs, but not all gains have been dissipated in this manner.
For example, in 1968 feed costs were lower compared to milk prices than in 1965,
but the price of cows was higher. Apparent Iy better milk prices were capita Iized
into higher cow costs. The net effect for most dairy men is an increase in net
income. The USDA report on Costs and Returns on Commercial Dairy Farms reports
that net returns to operators for labor and capital more than doubled from 1965 to
1968. This, of course, represented not only price increases but also continuing
farm adjustments.
It appears that the price and income picture for the dairy industry is such that
strong support for increasing the price support level will be difficult to develop,
Congress is not likely to be receptive to the suggestion.
One possible change which is receiving serious consideration is the authority
to lower the mandatory support level for the milkfat component of milk as long as
the price of milk is above the mandatory level. The law now specifies that both
milk and milkfat have to be supported at a minimum of 75 percent of parity, The
Apri I 1968 price support increase was achieved by raising only the purchase price
for nonfat dry milk and cheese to avoid an increase in the price of butter, But, the
price of fat in farm separated cream must be kept at least at 75 percent of parity.
In fact, subsequent to the 1968 increase in milk price support to $4.28 and the 1969
extension of this support level, the purchase price for butter had to be raised by-19-
1 l/4centsper pound to keep
wool
The formula by which the
slightly in the 1965 Act. The
available to U.S. producers.
fat in farm separated cream at 75 percent of parity.
farm support price for wool is computed was adiusted
result was an overal I increase in wool support prices
In spite of this increase, the national output of
woo I cent inued its long downward trend from 225 mi
1965 to 198 million pounds in 1968. The difference
in lion pounds of raw wool
between the domestic
utilization of apparel wool and the decreasing domestic output is being taken up
by imports from Austra Iia, New Zealand, South Africa and Latin America,
Cropland Adjustment Program (CAP)
As spel led out in the 1965 Act, the CAP is a. long-term land retirement
scheme designed to withdraw crop acreage from production for periods of 5-10
years. it resembles, in some ways, the old Soil 8ank Conservation Reserve program
of the 1950’s. 8ecause crop land base acres are removed from production for
extended periods, lower annual payment rates than for annual voluntary commodity




landowner’s costs of planting and holding the diverted acreage in
for maintaining access to the land for sportsmen, and for bringing
recreational uses. The CAP also contains provisions for a land
acquisition program, ca Iled Greenspan, under which local governments are assisted
in obtaining farm land for public recreational and conservation purposes such as parks,
wildlife refuges, and open spaces.-20-
The CAP was largely experimental during the life of the 1965 Act since only
abut $225 mi IIion was spent in the 1966-69 period. Moreover, no new agreements
for additional land were authorized in either 1968 or 1969 because Congress did
not appropriate funds for program expansion. A total of slightly over 4 million
acres of cropland were signed up in 1966 and 1967, of which about 16 thousand
acres were under the Greenspan proiect. For comparison., this 4 mil lion acres
is only about 2 percent as large as the combined 1969 national wheat al Iotment
and feed grain base.
The American Farm Bureau Federation has advocated a large sca Ie program of
long-term land retirement. The administration also seems to be interested in a
program along these Iines. It would appear that through CAP the authority for such
a program a Iread y exists. What is lacking is the necessary funding by the Congress.-21-
The Political Setting for Agricultural Legislation in 1970
The decline in the farm population compared with the total population signals
changes in farm politics which have yet to make their full impact felt. A signi-
ficant shift has occurred, however, in the number of U.S. Representatives from
rural -farm districts. Congressional Quarterly recently published a Iist of Con-
gressional districts , compiled by the American Farm Bureau Federation, which
contained 25 percent or more farm popu Iat ion. The total number of districts
identified as “rural-farm” using this criterion was only 31. The East contained
none; the West 1; the South 14; and the Midwest, 16. However, Iowa, North
Dakota and Wisconsin from the Midwest group are proiected to lose a Congressional
seat after the 1970 census. Furthermore, it is virtual Iy certain that unless a state
contains only one House district , it wil I have to redistrict after 1970 in accordance
with iudicial standards. Consequently this wil I lead to even fewer “rural-farm”
districts and a further reduction in the importance of the farm vote in electing
House members.
Smal Ier numbers of House members representing farm districts are not the
whole story, however. An offsetting factor is that most “safe” seats in the House
and the Senate are found
Congressional Quarterly,
in rural areas, particularly in the South and in the
June 27, 1969 pp. 1137.-22-
Midwestern Farm Belt states. Safe seats lead to long incumbencies, seniority on
committees and powerfu I committee chairmanships. Another factor which stiII
makes the farm vote a force to be reckoned with is its demonstrated volat iIity in
certain states. Where elections are won and lost by very smal I margins, Senate
and Presidential canal idates cannot afford to ignore the farm vote even if it com-
prises as little as 5% of the total.
The 91st Concwess
Both the Senate and House are control led by the Democratic Party. As the
Congress convened on January 3, 1969, the Senate stood at 57 Democrats to 43
Republicans while the House was split 243 Democrats to 192 Republicans. The
individuals who occupy leadership positions in the House have probably been
more closely associated with agricultural matters in the past then have those in the
Senate. Most of the important chairmanships in both houses are held by Southern
Democrats.
The Agriculture Committees
The Senate Agricu Iture and Forestry Committee is dominated by Southern
Democrats who possess a great deal of seniority. These committee members command
power and influence with their fel low Senators, by virtue of their experience and
ability and because of their positions on other important Senate committees. The
Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee is small --7 Democrats and 6 Republicans--
but it includes the 2nd, 3rd and 7th ranking Democrats in the Senate and the 1st,
2nd, and 10th ranking Republicans. Of the 7 Democrats, al I but one are conservatives-23-
from Southern states. Senator McGovern (South Dakota) is the exception, both
in terms of geography and philosophy. Republicans serving on this Committee
are also usual Iy thought of as conservative in outlook with the possible exception
of Senator Aiken (Rep. - Vermont) ranking minority member. The Midwest is
represented on the minority side with members from North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska,
and Kansas.
Nine of the 13 members of this committee were serving on it in 1965 when
the present Food and Agriculture Act was passed. All of the Democrats except
one were members then as were the three ranking Republicans presently serving.
The Chairman, Senator El lender (Democrat - Louisiana) is 2nd ranking
member of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Senator Hol land (Democrat -
Florida) is the 5th ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and
chairman of the Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee. He is also Chairman
of the most important of the Senate Agricultural Subcommittees, the Subcommittee
on Agricultural Production, Marketing and Stabilizat ion of Prices. Senator
Eastland (Democrat - Mississippi) is Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Among the Republicans on the Agriculture and Forestry Committee, Senator Aiken
also serves as ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
while Senator Young (Republican - North Dakota) is ranking minority member of
the Senate Appropriations Committee.
A number of younger Senators , usually classified as among the liberals and
from outside of the South have left the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee-24-
over the past several sessions. Thedeparture of these men Ieft the committee witha
strong cotton-tobacco-livestock commodity orientation, substantial Iy conservative
in outlook with diminished concern for urban problems, and with fewer Democratic
members who consistently support the policies of the Senate Democratic leadership.
It is likely that most members of this committee want price and income programs
favorable to producers and would support voluntary production controls for this
purpose. They should not have great difficulty in reporting farm legislation
acceptable to a ma[ority of their fellow Senators, but their proposals on food
stamp legislation may be altered and expanded on the Senate floor.
The House Agriculture Committee is made up of 34 members--l9 Democrats
and 15 Republicans. Just as Senate Agriculture Committee members tend to come
from the most rural states, House Committee members tend to come from some of
the more rural congressional districts. Agricu Itural matters are of great importance
in these districts and in many cases, one or two crops are predominant. House
members usual Iy have only one or two committee assignments so that they do not
wield as much influence outside their committees as their Senate counterparts.
Although a number of states are represented on the Committee, it also is dominated
by members from the South and Southwest where cotton, tobacco, Iivestock ard feed
grains are maior crops.
Based on census regions, Committee membership is divided geographically
as fol lows: South, 17; West, 6; North Central, 7; and Northeast 4. Minnesota
is represented on this committee by Representative John Zwach (Rep. from the-25-
6th District) Representative Z wach serves on the Subcommittee on Dairy and
Poultry and the Subcommittee on Livestock and Feed Grains.
W. R. Poage (Texas - Democrat) chairs the committee. The commodity
subcommittee chairman are:
Cotton - Thomas Abernethy (Democrat - South Carol ins)
Dairy and Poultry - Frank Stubblefield (Democrat - Kentucky)
Forests - John McMil Ian (Democrat - South Carolina)
Livestock and Grains - Graham Purcel I (Democrat - Texas)
Oilseeds and Rice - Maston O ‘Neal (Democrat - Georgia)
Tobacco - Watkins Abbitt (Democrat - Virginia)
Another center of power in the House is the Agricultural Appropriations
Subcommittee which must appropriate the funds for the U.S. D.A. and the price
support and income programs for farmers. Jam ie Whitten (Democrat - Mississippi),
who chairs this subcommittee, is highly knowledgeable about all phases of agri-
cultural programs. He tends to dominate the appropriation review process and his
wishes and special interests cannot be ignored in the formu Iat ion of programs and
budgets. Minnesota is represented on the Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee
by Odin Langen (Rep. from the 7th District).
The Administration
Neither the Republican Party platform nor the political campaign bound the
President to a particular course of action in agricultural matters. The platform
pledged farm policies and programs to enable producers to receive fair prices-26-
compared to prices they pay; it mentioned reorganizing the marketing of the
Commodity Credit Corporation (whit h the Johnson Administration had been
accused of manipulating to hold down food prices); it recognized as a goal “the
revitalization of rural America, ” and promised attempts to achieve “a more
direct voice for the farmer. “
Since his inauguration, President Nixon has moved slowly in prodding the
Congress. On October 13 he called for action on 12 reform measures on which he
placed high priority. Agricultural programs were not on this list, although the
elimination of malnutrition and hunger was emphasized in the 20 or so additional
items he mentioned.
In considering the Administration’s perspective of farm programs it must
be noted that President Nixon’s major preoccupation is Vietnam policy and urban
affairs. Furthermore, both houses of the Congress are control led by the opposition
party. A Republican President facing a Democratical Iy-control led Congress is aware -
of the great difficulty of securing major changes in agricultural programs without
the support or at least acquiescence of key Congressional leadership. On the
other hand, committee leadership is also aware that without the acquiescence
of the President, their efforts can be blocked either by Presidential pressure on
Republican Congressmen whose support is needed, or ultimately, by a Presidential
veto. Some analysts view the choice of Clifford Hard in, a man without a strong
“political “ identification, as an indication that President Nixon will not seek
major changes in farm legislation. The Hardin proposals put forth to date lend-27-
support to the notion that an accommodation is being sought which wil I take the
form of amendments and changes; i.e., “improvements” in existing programs. The
posit ion of a coalition of farm groups expressing the desire to see a continuation
of present programs with some modifications may have contributed to this view.
The Growing Influence of Consumers
Consumers have
Increasingly pressured
become increasingly vocal on the subiect of food prices.
by inflation, American housewives have not always agreed
with the assertion that food is a bargain. There have been strong reactions to
rising prices, particular! y of meat items, at the neighborhood grocery. Direct
daily experiences with food prices coupled with the wide publicity given to
farm payments have contributed to a wave of supermarket demonstrate ions, Con-
gressional letter writ ing, and attempts to organize consumers. Congressmen and
the President are aware that the potential female electorate now outnumbers the
male electorate, and they are becoming quite sensitive to the concerns of consumers--
as witnessed by the President’s appointment of a Consumer Council and the mass
of consumer legislation that has been proposed and enacted. Thus it is not likely
that farm programs which result in higher consumer food costs wil I be acceptable
to any President whether Democrat or Republican.
The comparatively recent widespread recognition that hunger and malnutrition
exists in America has not worked to the credit of agriculture. In part this is because
the Agriculture Commit tees and the USDA have had jurisdiction over food stamp
and other food aid legislation. Nutrition groups, poor people’s groups, school-28-
administrators, medical people, church groups, and others are among those pushing
hard for expansion of these programs.
Other groups that have an economic stake in the formation of agricultural
policies and programs include main street businessmen in rural communities, food
processors, food storage and d istribut ion firms , manufacturers of farm inputs, con-
servation groups, and investors in farm real estate.
These groups’ views are not always in agreement with each other or with
those of farmers. Food processors, producers of farm supplies, and food storage
and transportation interests have a vested interest in high volume farm production.
Conservation groups are interested in maintaining diversion and land retirement
schemes. Landowners and specu Iators have a vested interest in tight Iy controlled
programs and high Ieve Is of price supports. Rural congressmen and rural businessmen
do not want to see their communities depopulated by land-retirement programs.
Farm programs are obviously no longer sole Iy the concern of the farm producer.
Testimony before Congressional Committees , campaign contributions, publ ic
relations activities and close contact with Congress and agricultural leaders
are some of the ways in which these groups have become increasingly effective
in making their views felt.
Strategy and Tactics
Hearings began on July 15, 1969 in the House Agriculture Committee on bil Is
re Iat ing to general farm programs and food stamps. Chairman Poage wanted to
have a bil I ready to come out of committee by the end of December in order for-29-
the House to have sufficient time to act before the end of the session. Senate
hearings have not yet begun on farm legislation although a Senate bill on food
stamps has been reported. Prospects for early action in 1970 are not good in
view of the traditional slow pace in the first sessions of Congress. As late as
December, action on some 1970 fiscal year appropriations bi IIs had not been com-
pleted. This will put consideration of 1971 appropriations bills behind in the 1970
session. In addition foreign policy, welfare, military, and congressional reform
questions may be expected to occupy much time and energy in the 1971 session.
Hearings on the general farm program were scheduled concurrently with
hearings on the food stamp measure in the House in an apparent attempt to link
the two since food stamps are of great interest to urban members and the Republican
administration whi Ie farm programs are of great importance to Southern Democrats
and Midwestern Republicans. The attempts to Iink these two programs are an
indication of a changed relationship between agricultural committees and the
Congress. Based upon recent agricultural legislation and appropriations experience,
three generalizations may be made:
(1) Agriculture committees can no longer write their own tickets in these
areas. Votes of urban Congressmen are necessary for passage and committee mem-
bers must bear this fact in mind in reporting bills. Committee recommended bills
can be, and have been, substantial Iy altered on the floors of the Senate and House.
(2) Substantial pieces of agricultural legislation are more assured of passage
if there are some trade-offs available to use in bargaining fur urban members votes.-30-
(3) Agricultural legislation and appropriations bil Is have had a more
difficult time in the House than in the Senate in recent years. In the event there
are maior differences in the bi IIs reported by the House and Senate, the Conference
Committee which must reconcile these differences wil I face an arduous task in
arriving at an acceptable compromise.-31-
New Farm Legislation - Positions and Issues
Each farm organization has had an opportunity to present
farm legislation before the House Agriculture Committee. Two
its views on new
maior positions
have emerged. One of these is held by the American Farm Bureau Federation and
the other by a coalition of nearly al I other general farm and commodity organizations.
In the section
as well as the
The American
that follows the maior features of these two points of view are Iisted
position taken by the Administration.
Farm Bureau Federation Position
The proposal of the American Farm Bureau Federation reflects the long time
desire of that organization for substantial Iy less direct interference with market
mechanisms than we have had for a considerable period of time. Its proposal
represents a clear shift in that direction but at the same time recognizes also that
excess capacity does exist in American Agriculture. The Farm Bureau would
therefore use a land retirement program as an alternative to the present system
of production controls. The maior features of the Farm Bureau proposal were em-
bodied in a bill introduced by Congressmen Findley (Republican - Illinois). This
bil I would phase-out al I acreage controls, marketing quotas, processing taxes,
and direct payments for wheat,
reduce by 20 percent each year
feed grains and cotton over a five-year period, and
for five years the amount spent by government for
wheat, feed grain cind cotton programs.
Agricultural output would be restrained through the removal from production
of 10 million acres of land per year from 1971 to 1975, using a competitive bid-32-
basis and emphasizing whole farms. But in addition, the price of cotton, wheat,
feed grains and soybeans wou Id be supported at 85 percent of the previous three-
year market average.
The Farm Bureau hasalso advocated a program that is a break with the
tradition I commodity programs. It is a special assistance program for low-income
farmers, to be implemented outside of the marketing system. Under this program
low-income farmers would receive compensation for relinquished acreage al Iotments,
encourage them to move into more gainful employment. In addition there would be
retraining grants as wel I as adjustment assistance and loans to help them to prepare
for and find other employment.
The Coalition Position
The coalition is made up of both general and commodity organizations. The
present coal ition grew out of an earlier coalition which was formed to support the




the present coalition is to preserve the present commodity and
It was inspired in large part by a fear that the new Administration
might want to shift away from the provisions of the 1965 Act and back a massive
land retirement program as its basic production control mechanism such as has
been advocated by the American Farm Bureau Federation. Even though each
coal ition member has its own notions of desirable policies and program measures,
at this moment, each organization is submerging its own preferences in favor of the
to-33-
coalition position.
The maior legislative features desired by the coalition group are contained
in a bil I introduced by Congressmen Purcel I (Democrat - Texas). For the most part,
these provisions are supplements to or changes in the 1965 Act which would be
extended for an indefinite period of time. The changes that wou Id be implemented
under the Purcell Bill apply mainly to commodity programs. For dairy, the bill
authorizes an advertising and promotion check-off under Fed era I Mi Ik orders,
and loosening of Class I base plan regulations where they are in effect to permit
easier access to fluid markets for new producers. For corn, the price received by
the farmers would be supported at 90 percent of parity including direct payments,
The loan rate would be not less than $1.15 per bushel. Other feed grains would
be supported in relation to corn.
The wheat provisions of the coalition bill provide for a price of 100 percent
of parity on domestic wheat certificate production while wheat with export
certificates would be supported at 65 to 90 percent of parity. Wheat not accompanied
by marketing certificates would be supported at $1.25 per bushel. In addition,
for cooperators, there would be a special export payment of $.65 per bushel on
not less than 40 percent of the normal production of wheat grown on al Iotment
acres. Advanced wheat payments would be provided. The bi II also provides for a
5 percent Iimit on the amount %ormal” yield may be reduced in a year when
yields fal I because of natural disaster. The bill also provides for a commodity
reserve and extends marketing orders to additional commodities.-34-
Thus the bill supported bythecoalition is one which extends the 1965 Act.
But in addition it would greatly increase the government’s role in the soybean
economy. It includes provisions which would result in significant price
boosts to producers of most commodities. Wheat growers part icular Iy wou Id receive
a substantial boost through an export subsidy. The effect of these changes would
be substantially higher program costs.
It has been pointed out that many organizations have gone on record in
support of the coalition position even though they do have individual programs that
they support. The Nat ional Farmers Union would prefer stronger production controls
and increased bargaining power for farmers in addition to extending and strengthening
existing programs. The N FU is strongly opposed to a massive land retirement
program. The Nat iona I Grange a Iso urges the cent inuat ion of existing programs
and has singled out higher support prices for wheat growers as a necessary desirable
change. The Nat ional Grange supports the increased use of the CAP program,
and has not ruled out land retirement programs as a replacement to the annual
commodity program. The National Farmers Organization has expressed a preference
for its Farmers Self Determination Farm Program under which, through a producer
referendum, farmers wou Id choose among various levels of price support and
planted acres calculated to achieve the result. The N FO proposal would give
farmers as a group a choice ranging from 60 to 90 percent of parity.
Various commodity organizations have also made their desires known in
the matter of farm legislation. For example, the National Livestock Feeders-35-
Association supports the continuation of the 1965 Act coupled with land retirement
programs. They indicate that land retirement should emphasize less productive
land but that the amount of land retired in a county should not exceed a certain
Iimit. They are strongly opposed to al lowing retired acres to
production. The American National Cattlemen’s Association
opposition to land retirement if retired land is to be grazed.
groups have expressed simi Iar views.
be used for beef
has stated its
Other commodity
Various non-farm groups have taken positions and support various changes
in agricultural legislation. The United States Chamber of Commerce, for example,




non-farm uses. They wou Id advocate a transitional program and provide
assistance to both people and rural communities suffering from the impact
use ad iustment.
The Administration’s Position
Secretary of Agriculture Iiardin has placed the views of the Administration
before the House Agriculture committees. So far, the Administration approach
has been one of offering alternatives rather than strongly backing a specific
proposal. Thus it has offered two approaches that might be followed. These
have been referred to as the set-aside and the
discussion of the Administration’s position has
domestic al Iotment program. Most
focused on the set-aside proposal.
The set-aside plan would pay farmers to “set aside” or divert from production
a portion of their wheat, cotton and feed grain acreage al Iotments iust as present-36-
programs do. However, farmers having complied with theset-aside vmuldbe
permitted toplunt their remaining acres to any crop or combination of crops they
desire. They then would be eligible for price support Ioanson their entire
production. For example, acooperating feed grain farmer would set aside acres
equal to a certain proportion--between 30 to 50 percent--of his feed grain base
acres in addition to his normal conserving base acres. He might divert additional
acres for which he would receive a diversion payment. He would then collect
direct income support payments on the normal yield of one half of his feed grain
base. He would be eligible for price support loans on his total production.
A cooperating wheat producer would be required to set aside from his
farming operation acres equal to from 75 to 100 percent of his domestic al Iotment
acres. His entire crop harvested would then be eligible for price support loan.
Wheat certificate payments would be made on an amount of wheat equal the normal
yield of his domestic allotment acres. Cotton producers wou Id come under a program
much Iike the wheat program.
Under the Administrate ion’s proposal, price supports wou Id be for the purpose
of providing credit to farmers and not as an important vehicle for maintaining farm
income. This would be accomplished through the payments aspect of the program.
In addition to the set-aside and the domestic al Iotment program, the
Administration has suggested that a program of acquiring production rights to
part icular crops through an easement plan be conducted on experimental basis.
The Administration also has advocated a loosening of Class I base plans authorized-37-
under Federal orders to permit easier access to markets by new producers.
What’s Ahead?
What wil I a new farm program, if one is developed, look Iike? In previous
sections we examined the results of past farm programs in general and commodity
by commodity. We ‘ve examined the political and economic framewdrk which
will have an important bearing on the outcome. We ‘ve identified the alternatives
that agricultural groups want to consider. In the closing section we highlight
the maior issues that seem to be involved and wil I need to be resolved in developing
new legislation.
It was pointed out earlier that the 1965 Act was patterned after some of the
programs developed in the early 1960’s and departed significant Iy from the programs
of the 1950’s. Again , an issue among farm groups, particularly between the American
Farm Bureau Federation and other farm organizations, is whether or not new legisla-
t ion shou [d cent inue in the general pattern set by the present program, or if some
drastic departure should be fol lowed. It would seem that new agricultural legisla-
tion might be expected to continue in the pattern set by the 1965 Act, for the
fol lowing reasons:
1. The proposals offered by the Administration so far have not been
changes that alter the fundamental operating procedures of the
1965 Act, but rather, have been in the nature of changes which
modify present programs and which add flexibility from both the
administration and farmer point of view.-38-
2. Thepassage of the 1965 Act, was the personal handiwork of many of
the present agricultural committee members. It would seem that at
Ieast these individuals might prefer toseenew legislation follow
existing directions rather than departing drastically from them.
3. A bill in the mold of the 1965 Act would seem to be a means of
gaining a compromise between a Democratical Iy controlled Congress,
which passed the 1965 Act, and a Republican Administration, which
has offered changes which improve upon the basic legislation which
was developed.
It seems, therefore, that in the view of farm groups and as far as the
administrative and congressional leadership on agricultural matters is concerned,
there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general nature of the legisla-
tion needed. The only important exception is the American Farm Bureau Federation.
It would seem at this point that the only “hitch” that could develop might
come from the urban sector of the economy. Many representatives of the urban
and industrial areas of the nation seem to be out of patience with agriculture.
They tend to resent pumping money into what appears to be an insoluble problem
while other high priority needs are inadequately funded. It is likely that in 1970
our domestic farm programs wi 11 be subiected to some of the most vigorous strut iny
they have had in a long time. If the Congressional committee structure fai Is to
conduct this kind of scrutiny, then possibly it will be conducted at the more
general floor level of the House and Senate. The strategy of attempting to-39-
commingle food distribution policy and agricultural policy has been noted previously.
Regard less of thesuccess ofthis strategy, obtaining new farm Legislation of the type
desired by the maiority of those interested in these matters, would seem to hinge
importantly on a few issues.
Payments Limits
In 1968, and again in 1969, Congress attempted to place a $20,000 ceiling
on individual farm payments. This is a change in the farm program strongly
desired not only by urban-based Congressmen but also by many from rural areas.
These are indications that a maiority of U.S. farmers also favor a limit on
payments. It has been estimated that a payment ce iIing of $20,000 per farm,
would affect only about 10,000 farmers or 1 percent of the one mil lion or so
1/
commercial farmers in the United States. - A limitation on direct payments
of the magnitude generally discussed would affect principally cotton and sugar
growers.
The limit on direct payments is viewed by many as being a means of
achieving a partial redress among farmers of the inequitable distribution of
program benefits and as a means of reducing the overal I cost of agricu Itural
programs,
payment
some form of Urban representatives are Iikel y to continue to work for
imitation to be included in new agricultural legislation.
Underlying the payments Iimits issue is the question of the overal I cost of
agricultural programs. Agricu Iture has absorbed sizeable government expenditures
1/ Other methods for Iimiting farm payments have been devised. Some of these
provide for a graduated scale of payments Iimits whi Ie others would impose crop
by crop limits.-40-
with little apparent improvement while other critical needs are inadequately
funded because of huge expenditures in other areas particularly the war in
Viet Nam. Even though urban representatives strongly desire a reduction in
the cost of farm programs, they very likely also recognize that the possibility
of quickly reducing costs by a significant amount is quite remote. On the other
hand, they are likely to work very hard to prevent further rises and possibly
achieve modest reductions.
Program Flexibility
An issue that is of primary importance to those direct Iy interested in
agriculture, but with overtones extending to the non-agricultural sector of the
economy, is the matter of maintaining or increasing flexibility in commodity
program provisions. This is achieved by giving to the Secretary of Agriculture
the authority to make , within certain limits, decisions with respect to certain
program dimensions such as level of price supports, rates of direct payments,
acreage diversion required, and other program features.
Many farm groups and agricu Itural committee members probably prefer
that farm legislation be stated in fairly specific terms with a fairly narrow area
in which administrative decisions may be made. However, rapid changes in all
phases of agriculture render this type of legislation obsolete very quickly. The
alternative is to increase the area in which administrative decisions may be made.
Under the 1965 Act the Secretary of Agriculture has considerably more
discretionary authority under the feed grain program than it is general Iy considered-41-
that he does, for example, under the cotton program. Will the area of administrative
latitude be increased or narrowed? Wi II lawmakers and farm groups be wi IIing
to provide the flexibility that many think is needed? So far the policy debate on
new legislation has not focused on this question, but can be expected to do so.
Method of Setting Supports
An issue shaping up is the basis to be used for setting price supports. On
the one hand the coalition strongly advocates rigid price support formulas tied
to the parity price concept. The American Farm Bureau Federation and the
Administration, however, would completely break away from the use of parity




market price as the support level.
There are many questions on both sides of the issue that cannot be examined
however two comments seem to be appropriate on this issue. First, the use
average of previous years market price would be only a fairly smal I departure
from the methods now used in setting supports for some commodities. For example,
for corn if no acreage diversion program is in effect “price support is to be made —
available at a level between 50 and 90 percent of the parity price that the
2’ If an acreage Secretary determines would not result in increasing CCC stocks. “ -
2/ Farm Commodity and Related Programs, Agricultural Handbook No. 345
Agricultural and Stabilization and Conservation Service U.S. D.A. pp. 22-23.-42-
diversion program is in effect “the price support level for corn is to be set between
65 and 90 of the parity price determined by the Secretary to be necessary to
carry out the feed grain acreage diversion program goals. “ Thus, while parity
is used to specify Iimits for corn supports, other criteria are used as a basis of
determining the effective support level. In the case of wheat, not accompanied
by domestic marketing certificates, the relationship to parity price is completely
broken. Here support levels are based on competitive world prices, the feeding
value of wheat in relation to feed grain and the price support levels for feed
grains. For cotton, the loan rate is set “so that it does not exceed 90 percent of
the estimated average world price . . . “
The second point to be noted is that
average market price as a basis for setting
the use of the previous three year
supports wou Id not necessari Iy mean
a persistent decline in the
the possibility that market
as fall below. It neglects
loan level. The view that this would happen ignores
prices may also rise above the support level as wel I
the effect of setting CCC sales prices some 15 or 20
precent above the loan rate. In addition, such a view seems to ignore the impact
on market price that is introduced by production restraints implemented through
the commodity programs.
When will these and other issues be resolved and a new farm bill passed?
Chances seem to be very good that at best it wil I be summer before Congress gets
down to serious work on a new farm law. Other pressing matters such as 1971
appropriate ions bi I Is and welfare and draft reform wi II take precedence over-43-
agricultural matters. In addition, there is the questicm of food programs which
wil I require time to iron out the differences between the two houses. These factors
point to late summer before a bill is passed. If so, this will introduce a large
element of uncertainty for wheat producers
crop. However for corn, soybean and milk
not be serious.
who must make planting decisions for
producers late passage wou Id Iikel y
the new